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Of the numerous themes that straddle social psychology one has always struck me 
as a perennial intellectual challenge and problem from a relatively early date on. The  
challenge is simply the question of  how one reconciles the individual and social levels of 
analyses. The tension between the individual and the social constitutes not only a creative 
tension but it is also the source of an intellectual chasm within social psychology.  It is a 
question that has been raised and addressed in many different historical contexts (see 
Semin, 1986). Early attempts to resolve this duality are to be found in the 
Völkerpsychologie-tradition that was established by Lazarus and Steinhal (1860) and 
others (Lazarus, 1861; Waitz, 1859; Wedewer, 1860, inter alia). This then newly emerging 
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'discipline' consisted in an attempt to introduce a level of analysis that would be more 
encompassing than the one prevailing in the psychology of the mid nineteenth Century. 
More recently, this debate was initiated during the early and mid-seventies in social 
psychology (e.g., Israel & Tajfel, 1972). The intellectual chasm can be found in the fact 
that the very same tension is at the heart of many of the debates that has led to major 
divisions experienced by contemporary social psychology - particularly European social 
psychology. It is also at the core of some of the recent divisions that have emerged 
theoretically and methodologically (Gergen, 1985; Harré & Secord, 1972, inter alia). 
The question itself is relatively simple - how does one reconcile the individualist 
level of analysis in a branch of psychology that is expected if not supposed to address the 
'social', and not merely, individual functioning. The way this has been dealt within 
mainstream social psychology is by retaining a type of dualism that is inherent in a 
methodological commitment to individual reductionism (cf. Moscovici, 1984; Tajfel, 1972; 
Sampson, 1981, inter alia). This commitment is accompanied by a tacit assumption about 
the existence of 'society' outside of the individual.  
In the following, I would like to start by drawing attention to a particular paradox 
that has emerged in social psychology as a consequence of this methodological 
commitment to individual and the absenting of the social. I single out this particular 
example, since it allows me to use language as an illustrative way out of the duality created 
by the individual and the social levels of analyses and it also provides me to elaborate on 
the important and central role that language has as yet to come to play in an emergent 
social psychology. 
The Paradox: Social psychology is often defined as the analysis and explanation of social 
behaviour (cf. Kimble, 1990, p. 2; Sears, Peplau & Taylor, 1991, p. 2; Sabini, 1992, p. 1, 
inter alia). And yet, the prominent focus in mainstream social psychology is and has, for a 
long time been on the analysis and explanation of intra-psychological processes (cognitive 
and affective). As Marcus and Zajonc (1985) have pointed out  "Social psychology and 
cognitive social psychology are today nearly synonymous. The cognitive approach is now 
clearly the dominant approach among social psychologists, having virtually no 
competitors" (Marcus & Zajonc, 1985, p. 137). Although this statement is over ten years 
old this situation has not changed dramatically. Even in the analysis of intergroup 
processes and self-categorisation the focus is primarily on a tradition of cognitive 
processes and one can argue, as some have, that central theories in this field are "a prime 
candidate for reduction to 'basic' information processing laws" (Tetlock, 1986, p. 255; 
Jahoda, 1986). The paradox comes about through the fact that while the goal is to explain 
social behavior, the persistent methodological commitment has been to the processes or 
properties of individual agents. In other words, the methodological commitment has been 
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to intra-psychological processes rather than social behavior (inter-psychological 
processes) or even the interface between these two. What is and has been missing is a 
conceptual loop that brings the two disparate chains into some coherent interface and that 
is empirically examinable. Such a change also requires a shift in methodological 
commitment from that of the individual to that of the social. 
It is in this context that one has to start thinking about what it is that enables social 
behaviour and interaction. The answer is simple enough: Symbolic communication which 
can takes place by means of verbal or non-verbal symbols - G. H. Mead established this 
much some time ago (e.g., 1934). Indeed, Meadian social psychology treated forms of 
language as the mediators not only of cognition and consciousness but of the self and 
social interaction (cf. Rock, 1979, p. 111 ff.); an issue that is beginning to attract renewed 
attention in the context of socio-cultural theory and semiotic mediation (e.g., Wertsch, 
1991).  
I would like to argue here that the absence of a fruitful link between inter-
psychological and intra-psychological processes has primarily been due to the fact that in 
contrast to the analysis of intra-psychological processes, to date, we have not developed a 
handle on symbolic communication that allows us to make it amenable to systematic 
analysis. 
In principle, developing such a handle on social behaviour is, first of all, to advance 
an approach to language and thus symbolic communication that could furnish the analysis 
of inter-psychological processes with a privileged theoretical and empirical status. With 
privileged I mean a conceptual status that facilitates its analysis and empirical examination 
in a manner analogue to that afforded with intra-psychological processes. Not only that, I 
also mean a status that allows to interface the inter-psychological (social behaviour) with 
the intra-psychological in a meaningful way so that the interactive relation between the 
two types of processes can be sensibly examined. 
This argument is in itself not new. Pointing out the relevance of language for social 
psychology has been a fashionable argument in the social sciences and some of the more 
critical approaches to social psychology in particular and psychology in general (e.g., 
social constructionism, etc.). Unfortunately, these critical reflections upon the import of 
language to social psychological processes have remained policy statements without much 
if any systematic research ensuing upon them. Most of the work has remained descriptive 
and has been unable to link the inter-psychological with the intra-psychological. The 
difference between these approaches and the orientation represented here is that the 
current orientation proposes as link between the inter-psychological and the intra-
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psychological (cf. Semin, 1995). This is not necessarily an easy argument since it requires 
some rethinking about the way we consider language and cognition. 
The centrality of language for symbolic communication: Symbolic communication 
by which social interaction is maintained is a complex medium and its complexity has 
made it difficult to treat it such  that it is accessible to systematic and objective analysis 
that is commonly regarded as the road to a science. It is no doubt the case that physical 
interactions without verbal exchange are a rarity. It would certainly appear to be correct if 
one were to say that the somewhat direct forms of physical interactions are increasingly 
being replaced by verbal and other relatively abstract forms of interaction and exchange 
particularly in the emerging form of late 20th Century society, which can be best 
described as an "information culture". It is primarily in the form of words that information 
about human interactions and other events is communicated and stored. We live in a world 
where words have in fact taken over from behaviours in terms of physical or non-verbal 
communication. Indeed, we were on the way of loosing our reliance on non-verbal 
communication the moment humanity tripped over the fact that words can capture more 
complex forms of reality and abstract them in a more economical manner. Words have in 
the mean time become a weapon in an information society that is in fact growingly 
becoming incapable of dealing with non-verbal action2. We plan, broker, initiate, guide, 
bully, love, terrorise, terminate, justify or challenge through words. It is in words that we 
engage in social interaction and it is through a better understanding of words and their use 
that we can begin to appreciate social behaviour. Much of our behaviour essentially 
involves communication and is manifested in language use. Thus, studying language may 
contribute to unfolding inter-psychological processes.  
But if words are the means by which social behaviour is realised then an analysis of 
symbolic communication must begin with an approach that makes language accessible to an 
objective analysis. It is to this point that I now turn. This is relatively important since it 
constitutes a manner in which one can address the entire circle of social interaction taking 
into account the intra- as well as inter-psychological processes in the analysis of social 
psychological phenomena. 
Symbolic communication as tool use: The idea or metaphor that language is a tool upon 
which knowledge is mapped is critical to the development of this perspective. I use this 
analogy expressly to invite you to think about linguistic devices such as verbs, adjectives 
and nouns very much in the way in which one would think about hammers, saws and 
pliers. These tools, which are feats of centuries of engineering are not only the products of 
experience and knowledge, they also represent this knowledge. There is no doubt that I can 
splice a piece of wood into two with a hammer, but a saw is a more sophisticated tool 
engineered for this purpose. Indeed, I can push a nail into wood with the end of a saw, but 
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a hammer is a more appropriate tool to do so. Yet, certain hammers have other properties. 
They are also suitable to extract nails, and so on. These special tools contain the distilled 
knowledge about the relationship between a task and the best fit between a task or  goal 
and human propensities (in particular physical ones, namely, movement, handling, vision, 
etc.) 
One task that the 'language as a tool' metaphor entails is to examine and reveal the 
distinctive properties of such tools. In the case of interpersonal language, the first step for 
such a task is to identify the types of tools that are available. The second step is to 
determine the particular jobs for which such tools have been tailored. Obviously, these two 
steps are not independent from each other. We are able to identify properties of tools such 
as hammers, saws and pliers more readily because the match between task, tool and 
movement is more discernible. In contrast, the properties of linguistic tools are not so 
transparent. This is specially because language, in most of its facets (apart from its surface 
semantics), constitutes what Polanyi (1956) termed 'tacit knowledge'. Its properties are 
implicit. 
The first type of research (examining the properties of tools) is, by definition, 
decontextualized in that it focuses on "language" in the abstract. Therefore, it does not 
constitute an investigation of 'language in use', or "speech" (cf. de Saussure, 1914; Riceour, 
1954). 'Language-in-use' is the medium  of communication par excellence. This is the 
subject of the second type of research in which I would like to use in order to illustrate 
different possibilities of interfacing the inter- and intra-psychological. In the latter case the 
research questions are, among other things, about the strategic use of tools to communicate 
our intentions and goals in discourse; how such communication impacts others. 
An Approach to the Tools of Interpersonal Language: The analysis of the tools of 
interpersonal language is in the first instance a decontextualized one. This approach is 
informed by  a distinction that is widely shared and regarded as one of the central 
contributions by Ferdinant de Saussure and Louis Hjelmslev, namely the distinction 
between langue and parole, or language and speech. There exist a number of other 
distinctions that mimic the relationship between language as an abstract property of a 
linguistic community of speakers and its use, namely language and discourse, code and 
message (cf. Riceour, 1971) or pragmatic and semantic meaning contexts (Douglas, 1971; 
Meertz, 1985, inter alia). What is the relationship between language and speech? The 
answer to this question provides us a rationale of examining interpersonal tools separately 
from their use in everyday contexts. In order to be able to communicate an intention, 
experience, idea wish or desire, I have to access a medium that is "objective", namely 
shared and detached from each and every persons'. In Vygotski's terms: "In order to 
transmit some experience or content of consciousness to another person, there is no other 
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path than to ascribe the content to a known class, to a known group of phenomena, and as 
we know this necessarily requires generalisation. Thus, it turns out that social interaction 
necessarily presupposes generalisation and the development of word meaning, i.e., 
generalisation becomes possible with the development of social interaction" (Vygotski, 
1956/1987, p. 48-49). Thus, if you were to read the sentence "The sun is rising" then you 
know what it "means". But consider different contexts in which the same sentence is 
uttered by (1)one of two spies in the process of bugging an embassy office; (2) a couple in 
bed, who are married to different people; or (3) a farmer's wife to her husband. The 
sentence acquires different rhetorical qualities as a function of context and conveys 
completely different meanings. Respectively: (for the spies: "We must get out soon"; (2) 
for the couple: "My spouse may be coming back any time now", and; (3)for the farmers: 
"Its time to feed the animals", etc. But the sentence also carries a power in vacuo, a certain 
invariance, which is how you understood in reading it the first time without a context, 
namely "The sun is rising" - full stop. This is the distinction that is referred to by some as 
the difference between the pragmatic and semantic value or meaning. "Pragmatic meaning 
is defined as meaning that is dependent on context, while the semantic value of a sign is 
the meaning, or notional core, that it has apart from contextual factors" (Meertz, 1985, p. 
5). The decontextualized semantic value of words function as powerful invariant linguistic 
tools which in their variable strategic use convey what is referred to as indexical 
information (Bar-Hillel, 1955; Garfinkel, 1967; Mehan & Wood, 1975). Thus, an analysis 
of the tools of interpersonal language acquires some importance, since without an 
understanding of their properties it is difficult to understand their significance in use 
contexts. Three questions arise in this context, namely (a) What are the features of the 
sentence 'The sun is rising.', in the abstract, in contrast to its utterance in the context of an 
embassy bugging, etc., in other words, between 'language' and 'speech'?; (b) Related to (a), 
what are the features of the abstracted medium that I am accessing when I am 
communicating, and finally; (c) How is the sentence uttered 'in vacuum' made meaningful 
in distinct and different way from the sentence being uttered in a very specific context? 
As Ricoeur (1979) argues, language as a system is "virtual and outside of time" (p. 
530); it has no subject, that is the sentence 'The sun is rising.', on its own, does not evoke 
the question 'Who is speaking?'; the words and properties of such sentences can be 
understood with reference to language as a system; and what is more, language as a system 
(e.g., syntax, semantics) is the "condition for communication" (p. 531). That is, whereas 
language is timeless, without a subject and without a world, speech takes place in time; 
refers to its speakers (has subjectivity) and refer to as world and of course involves 
interlocutors. Thus, the knowledge represented in language is virtually "every persons' ", 
in that it is anonymous, 'objective' and detached form contextual circumstances (i.e., 
personal, situational, etc.) and it  facilitates the "reciprocity of perspectives through its 
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detachment from the uniqueness of the individuals involved" (Semin & Manstead, 1979). 
In this context, it is important not to forget that language is the condition for speech and 
communication3. 
The Tools of Interpersonal Communication: The analysis of the tools of interpersonal 
communication addresses the identification of the linguistic devices by which we 
characterise, describe and classify social interaction and its actors. In principle, one can 
look at any communicative act in a number of different ways: its manifest content, its 
structural and mechanical characteristics; the types of tools that are used; the meta-
semantic properties of such tools, etc. A research field that I have been engaged in for some 
time set out explicitly to identify categories of interpersonal terms as tools of 
communication about persons, their relationships and interactions. The aim of such work 
is to then analyse the properties of such tools. Summarily, one can describe this research 
as comprising of getting a systematic handle upon interpersonal language by proceeding 
through the following three steps: (1)  developing a taxonomy or classification of the tools 
of interpersonal language; (2) identifying the type of knowledge that is systematically 
mapped or coded in interpersonal language (e.g., the types of cognitive inferences that are 
systematically mediated by these tools); and, finally (3) to identify the uses that they can 
be put to. 
Let me provide a brief overview of some of the work we have done to illustrate these 
points (cf. Semin & Greenslade, 1985; Semin & Fiedler, 1991; Semin & Marsman, 1994). 
Our aim was to develop a framework that would enable us to analyse how interpersonal 
language marks both the features of social interaction and the properties of persons. To 
this end, we began by identifying a number of convergent linguistic criteria by means of 
which it was possible to systematically differentiate between different types of 
interpersonal verbs and adjectives4. 
Why is it relevant to analyse the properties of these linguistic devices or tools? 
Earlier on, when I gave the example of tools I referred to linguistic devices in much the 
same way as one would to saws, hammers, screw drivers, etc. There are particular 
purposes for which saws are suitable and others for which hammers are appropriate. The 
way in which these tools are designed represents the knowledge that has been accumulated 
and invested over centuries. One can therefore speak of the cognitive properties of such 
tools. Similarly, in using language, one makes (mostly unconsciously) strategic choices 
about the most suitable word or words to achieve or realise the goal or purpose one has in 
mind. Properties of tools refers to the types of things that one can do with such tools, that 
is their cognitive properties (cf. Semin, 1995) which define the range of things that are 
possible. Tools are not arbitrarily usable and are optimally suited for some tasks but not 
all. 
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 For instance, if I find out that verbs depicting actions focus the origin of the action 
(help, cheat, amuse) upon the sentence subject and verbs depicting  states (like, hate, 
admire) focus the origin of the event to the sentence object then I have an idea of a 
systematic cognitive property of the tool (Semin, 1995). Given a particular event, I can use 
different linguistic categories to depict it in a sentence (e.g., a - John hit David; b -John hurt 
David, c - John hates David; or, d - John is aggressive). If I know that the verbs in 
sentences a and b focus the origin of the depicted event to John and in sentence c to David, 
then I have a clear idea of what the different linguistic tools can do in symbolic 
communication. Such an analysis of the cognitive properties of linguistic tools reverses a 
persistent methodological commitment of psychological research. It means a shift of 
attention from processes or properties that are attributed to individual agents to the 
properties of the tools by which social communication and interaction are enabled. 
Therefore, this step, namely analysing the cognitive properties of tools (not individuals) 
constitutes an important step towards privileging the status of the inter-psychological in 
social psychology. 
Next, I shall illustrate how knowledge of such tools allows to examine not only their 
strategic use in communicative contexts but also how knowledge of tool properties allows 
to infer the cognitive processes that systematically mediate strategic communication. There 
are a few fields in which such strategic language use has been demonstrated (e.g., de Poot & 
Semin, 1995; Semin, Rubini & Fiedler, 1995; Semin & de Poot, 1996), but I shall in  the 
following focus on the work of Anne Maass and her colleagues to illustrate the point about 
strategic language use as tool use in the context of stereotypes and their communication. 
The strategic use of tools in communicative contexts - the case of stereotype transmission: 
It is possible to investigate how people use language in a strategic manner to communicate 
stereotypes in a rather and even subconscious manner (cf. Franco & Maass, 1996) only 
when one has a clear idea of the cognitive properties of the tools that are employed in the 
interpersonal domain. This is very much like deciphering the implicational meanings of a 
secret language. Such a deciphering reveals why particular tools are used in particular 
contexts and for what purpose. It is not only possible to examine why particular tools are 
used but also what types of cognitive implications they are expected to mediate and thus 
which types of effects or influence the produced verbal behavior is intended to have. This 
means that a systematic knowledge of the tools used in communication reveals three 
psychologically important aspects of inter-psychological processes which are never 
revealed by a methodological commitment to the individual. These are: (a) what are the 
motives of the person communicating a stereotype; (b) what strategic decisions does such 
a person make in order to convey a particular intended content and goal, and finally (c) 
what function does such a communicative composition have?  
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An added advantage of the precise understanding of the implications of interpersonal 
tools is the precise quantitative objectification of verbal behaviour that is also a reliable 
method. The research on the transmission and maintenance of stereotyping is a well-
researched phenomenon, namely the so-called Linguistic Intergroup Bias, introduced by 
Maass and her colleagues (Maass & Arcuri, 1992; Maass, Arcuri, Salvi and Semin, 1989; 
Maass, Milesi, Zabbini and Stahlberg, 1994; Fiedler, Semin & Finkenauer, 1993; Rubini & 
Semin, 1994, inter alia). 
This research question is about how positive perceptions of the in-group and 
negative perceptions of an out-group are not only maintained in the face of contradictory 
evidence, but how they are transmitted. The emphasis is on transmitted - namely, what are 
the types of verbal behaviours that are manifested in order to achieve or influence specific 
types of intra-psychological ends? The main argument that is used by the linguistic 
intergroup bias approach is that positive behaviours when they are performed by the in-
group lead to descriptions of such behaviours with more abstract predicates (e.g., "She is 
helpful and kind"). In contrast, if the same behaviour is performed by an out-group 
member, then the same behaviour is described with concrete predicates (e.g., she held the 
door open for somebody). The reverse is the case with negative behaviours. When such a 
behavior is performed by an in-group member, then concrete predicates are used to 
describe the behaviour (e.g., "She insulted somebody"). However, if the same negative 
behaviour is performed by an out-group member then an abstract predicate is more likely 
to be used (e.g., "She is rude or aggressive"). 
In principle, any given event could be described at any level of predicate use 
identified in the Linguistic Category Model (see Semin & Fielder, 1991). Thus, a particular 
event of aggression can be described as 'John punched David'', or 'John hurts David', 'John 
hates David'', or 'John is violent or aggressive'. There are two points that are relevant given 
the choice that is available. The first one is that, as the research on this subject shows, 
predicate choice in describing such behaviours as a function of group membership is not 
random. More importantly, that the choice of predicates conveys something more than the 
mere surface semantics. The more abstract predicate choice implies greater stability of the 
behaviour in question and higher likelihood of the behaviour being repeated in the future. 
Thus, if one is confronted with a positive behaviour of an out-group member, then 
predicate choice in describing such behaviour becomes critical. One does not wish to 
convey an impression of denying reality or denigrating it. Thus, the best possible choice is 
to use tools that convey the impression that the event was situated, particularistic and 
temporary and not open one's self to challenge. In contrast, the same behaviour performed 
by an in-group is conveyed with abstract predicates, conveying the impression of a 
positive feature that is a stable characteristic of the in-group member. 
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The first set of experiments (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri & Semin, 1989) used members of 
competing real life groups in a horse race competition in Ferrara (Italy). In two critical 
experiments utilising different dependent measures, (including open-ended descriptions of 
positive and negative behaviours of in- and out-group members), it was shown that people 
use more abstract predicates when describing positive in-group and negative out-group 
behaviours and more concrete predicates when describing positive out-group and negative 
in-group behaviours. 
This phenomenon has been demonstrated in a number of different contexts and 
settings such as sports teams, nations (Arcuri, Maass & Portabello, 1994). political groups 
(Rubini & Semin, 1994) and in mass media reports (Maass, Corvino & Arcuri, 1994). The 
more recent developments on this research have been concerned with making differential 
predictions about the types of intra-psychological processes that may be responsible for 
the generation of specific strategic tool choices in order to subtly transmit stereotypes 
(Maass, Milesi, Zabbini & Stahlberg, 1994). The contrasting models that have been 
examined are between an expectancy versus in-group-protective motivational based 
predictions. Thus, the question has become whether the particular verbal behaviours in 
question is driven by cognitive or motivational factors (cf. Rubini & Semin, 1994). The 
expectancy based model predicts that expectancy congruent behaviour, irrespective of 
whether the behaviour in question is positive or negative and irrespective of whether or not 
it is performed by the in-group or the out-group will be described in abstract terms. Thus, 
if Italians regard themselves as lazy (a negative property) then such behaviour that is 
typically classifiable as lazy will be described with abstract predicates although it is 
regarded as a negative characteristic. Similarly, if the out-group performs a behavior that is 
regarded as positive but typical then this also will be communicated with the use of 
abstract predicates. In contrast, unexpected or surprising behaviour will be described in 
concrete terms. The opposite predictions are derivable from a motivational perspective. 
One possible implication of Tajfel and Turner's (1979) social identity theory is that LIB 
reflects an in-group protective motivation. This perspective, in contrast to the differential 
expectancy model suggests that irrespective of expectancies LIB will occur as a function of 
the valence of the behaviors in question. Indeed, Maass, Milesi, Zabbini and Stahlberg 
(1994) in a series of three experiments find support for the expectancy hypothesis rather 
than the in-group protective motivation notion. However, more recently, Maass and 
Stahlberg (1993) have reported that under conditions where intergroup competition is high 
and salient one finds that the Linguistic Intergroup Bias is more pronounced than the 
differential expectancies condition. Taken together Maass and Stahlberg (1993) suggest 
that differential expectations are sufficient to produce the Linguistic Intergroup Bias. 
However, under heightened intergroup competition conditions the in-group-protective 
motivation increases this effect. They could show that there is a correlation between the 
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degree to which the bias is manifested and self esteem. More importantly, their research 
extends the applicability of this bias, with qualifications, from the inter-group context to 
inter-individual relationships, namely verbal exchange about 'friends' and 'enemies'. 
These studies taken altogether constitute a programmatic attempt to investigate the 
processes that are involved in the translation of specific intra-psychological processes into 
a medium: namely, language and language use. Their aim and design is to demonstrate how 
particular intra-psychological processes lead to strategic tool use with the purpose of 
conveying preferences that can effect the recipient of the message. This step, namely the 
step of how and whether the strategic use of tools  influence the recipient of the message 
have as yet not been analysed empirically in the context of LIB. The process of strategic 
language use and its influence upon a recipient has also been analysed systematically in a 
different context, namely how strategic word choice in the formulation of questions can 
influence a respondent's answers without their awareness (cf. Semin & de Poot, 1996; 
Semin, Rubini & Fiedler, 1995, inter alia). 
The relevance of language for social psychology: Conclusions:  There is no doubt that the 
importance of language for social psychology has been recognised relatively early on. 
Indeed, if one regards attribution theory as one of the most successful conceptual 
frameworks that has dominated social psychology for a considerable period of time, then 
one has to realise that this was based on Heider's (1956) original, careful and insightful 
analyses of language in his volume on "The psychology of interpersonal relations". His 
detailed analysis of a number of specific linguistic expression that are highly relevant to the 
interpersonal domain were primarily interpreted in a Zeitgeist which had a methodological 
commitment to the individual and therefore had to disregard the analysis of powerful 
linguistic devices. If it is the case that the purpose of social psychology is to examine the 
establishment of a social reality and inter-psychological processes then an important task 
is to investigate the glue that holds persons together in communication. It is this persistent 
message, that has been signalled from the early 19th Century psychologists who were 
concerned with Völkerpsychologie to the inspirational work on language and interpersonal 
relations by Heider that we, in my view,  have to take more seriously. Language and its 
strategic use is the paramount social reality within which all social psychological process 
take place, are manifested and managed. It is the pursuit of the subtle but fascinating 
properties of this medium which brings us together, by which we cheat or influence each 
other. It is the medium through which we gossip or prejudge others, argue help,. advise. 
Language is the most generally authorised artefact for which there are no individual 
authors. It is therefore one of the best instances of that aspect of our lives that is truly 
social and without which we would not be able to experience and communicate our 
subjective existences. it is words that are the most important glue of social behavior and it 
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is the chemical composition of this glue that we have to understand better if we want to 
develop a social psychology that  is attentive to an important aspect of what it means to 
be social. 
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Footnotes: 
                                            
1 The writing of this paper was facilitated by an NWO Grant PGS 56-381. I would 
like to thank Craig McGarty and Alex Haslam for their helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
2Indeed, non-verbal action or non representational behaviour is the undoing of the  
information culture which we live in.  
3Indeed, to the extent that language is a condition for speech, discourse or 
communication, it is also reproduced in any speech event. As Giddens (1976) points 
out: "Language exists as a 'structure', syntactical and semantic, only in so far as there 
are some kind of traceable consistencies in what people say, in the speech acts which 
they perform. From this aspect to refer to rules of syntax, for example, is to refer to 
the reproduction of 'like elements'; on the other hand, such rules generate the totality 
of speech acts which is the spoken language. It is this dual aspect of structure, as both 
inferred from observations of human doings, and yet as also operating as a medium 
whereby these doings are made possible, that has to be grasped through the notions of 
structuration and reproduction" (pp. 121-122, emphasis in the original). 
4This procedure circumvents the problem of circularity in defining categories by 
psychological criteria alone. 
